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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [KGIC](#) [US](#)  
SUBJECT: GICNT: ENCOURAGE SINGAPORE TO ENDORSE GICNT PRIOR  
TO APRIL 12-13 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

REF: A. A. CANBERRA 57468  
[B. B. CANBERRA 54399](#)  
[C. C. STATE 37989](#)

[1. \(U\)](#) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

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SUMMARY  
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[2. \(U\)](#) Appropriate Embassy officials are requested to approach the Government of Singapore (GoS) to encourage Singapore's endorsement of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Statement of Principles. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Vann Van Diepen, recently led U.S. participation in the Third Counterproliferation Dialogue with the GoS (January 26-27) and strongly encouraged the GoS to become a partner to the GICNT. Endorsing the GICNT prior to the Nuclear Security Summit (April 12-13) would demonstrate Singapore's staunch commitment to combating the threat of nuclear terrorism at a time when many heads of state/government will be assembling to focus specifically on nuclear security. Endorsing the GICNT will also establish Singapore as a regional leader on nuclear terrorism issues and allow it to play a valuable role in enhancing regional capacity to combat this shared threat in Southeast Asia. (Note: Singapore would be the second country in Southeast Asia to endorse the GICNT, after Cambodia.) While participation in GICNT activities is strictly voluntary, Singapore could benefit from taking part in a series of 2010 GICNT workshops that are only open to GICNT partners in areas such as nuclear forensics, detection, legal frameworks, terrorist financing, and information sharing. The GoS could also leverage the expertise and resources of the GICNT partnership in order to enhance indigenous nuclear security capabilities and achieve its broader foreign policy goal of maintaining stability in Southeast Asia.

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OBJECTIVES  
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[3. \(U\)](#) Post is requested to pursue the following objectives with appropriate host government officials:

-- Reinforce to GoS the benefits of endorsing the GICNT (see para 8).

-- Allay GoS concerns about resource limitations, stressing instead the importance of sending a strong political message about Singapore's commitment to combating the shared threat of nuclear terrorism.

-- Underscore that GICNT endorsement places no additional burdens on the GOS and that participation in GICNT activities is strictly voluntary.

-- Secure a commitment from the GoS to endorse the GICNT Statement of Principles in advance of the Nuclear Security Summit (April 12-13). For reference, the Statement of Principles have been provided in this cable (para 11) in the event that Singapore requests to view them.

-- Explain that endorsement requires only transmission of diplomatic notes to the GICNT Co-Chairs (the United States and Russian Federation), and provide the sample letter of endorsement at para 12.

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REPORTING DEADLINE  
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¶4. (U) Department requests that Post report the GoS,s response by March 8, 2010.

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BACKGROUND ON GICNT OUTREACH TO SINGAPORE  
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¶5. (U) The United States and Russia, sometimes in coordination with Japan and Australia, have approached the GoS on numerous occasions to encourage endorsement of the GICNT (reftels A, B, and C). The most recent approach was by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Vann Van Diepen, during the Third Counterproliferation Dialogue with the GoS (January 26-27). During prior outreach efforts, the GoS cited resource constraints as preventing it from endorsing the GICNT, as it does not want to join if it cannot dedicate the manpower to make a substantive contribution. The GoS also questioned what benefits it would gain as partner in the GICNT, instead choosing to focus its limited resources on participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

¶6. (U) We recognize Singapore's concern about limited resources and the ability to substantively contribute to the GICNT through the organization and hosting of activities. Endorsement of the GICNT Statement of Principles, however, does not require organizing and hosting activities, nor does it require any specific legal or financial commitments. Participation in and hosting of GICNT activities is strictly voluntary. Rather, endorsement sends an important political message indicating a country's association with a multinational consensus to develop and implement best practices to address the shared global threat of nuclear terrorism.

¶7. (U) The GICNT is complementary to PSI, UNSCR 1540, and other nonproliferation activities and strives to implement steps that fill gaps not addressed elsewhere. The U.S. and Russian Co-Chairs also take steps to ensure that activities hosted by GICNT partners are shaped in a way that permits a coordinated approach to combating nuclear terrorism and builds capacity in areas of specific nations, needs. Of the 77 GICNT partner nations, 65 are also members of PSI. Additionally, the GICNT includes several prominent partners who are not part of PSI, such as China, India, and Pakistan.

¶8. (U) There are several benefits, outlined below, that the GoS would gain as partner to the GICNT at no cost.

-- Endorsing the GICNT prior to the Nuclear Security Summit, at a time when many heads of state/government will be assembling to focus specifically on nuclear security, would demonstrate to the international community Singapore's staunch commitment to combating the threat of nuclear terrorism.

-- Endorsement would allow Singapore to leverage the expertise and resources of the GICNT partnership in order to enhance indigenous nuclear security capabilities and achieve its broader foreign policy goal of maintaining stability in Southeast Asia. In particular, Singapore would be able to

participate in a series of 2010 GICNT workshops that focus in areas such as nuclear forensics, detection, legal frameworks, and terrorist financing.

-- Singapore would be a valuable partner to the GICNT given its geostrategic location and if it chooses, could play an important role in enhancing regional capacity to combat nuclear terrorism in Southeast Asia.

-- The GICNT provides a forum for Singapore to cooperate on these issues with non-PSI nations such as Pakistan, India, and China. As an active PSI member, Singapore would join with the 65 GICNT partner nations who participate in both initiatives in order to take a holistic approach to counterproliferation issues and combating nuclear terrorism.

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BACKGROUND ON THE GICNT  
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¶9. (U) The GICNT is a cross-cutting strategic framework of 77 partners and 4 official observers that are determined to strengthen individual and global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to a nuclear terrorist event. Partners of the GICNT are committed to a set of nuclear security principles that encompass a broad range of deterrence, prevention, detection, and response objectives. Through voluntary participation in multilateral activities and exercises, partners share best practices and lessons learned in order to strengthen both individual and collective capabilities to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. Since the inception of the GICNT, partners have conducted over thirty GICNT activities and five senior-level meetings. These events have resulted in greater networking and transparency among the international community and enhanced coordination within individual partner nation governments.

¶10. (U) During his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama called for the GICNT to become a & durable international institution.<sup>8</sup> The United States and Russia, Co-Chairs of the GICNT, are currently taking tangible steps that will transform the GICNT into an action-oriented and institutionalized program. Additionally, the GICNT has a series of workshops scheduled for 2010 covering topics such as nuclear forensics, nuclear detection, legal frameworks, counterterrorist financing, and information sharing. The aim of these workshops is to develop nuclear security core competencies that would assist partners in implementing the GICNT Statement of Principles.

¶11. (U) Begin text of the GICNT Statement of Principles:

Participants in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are committed to the following Statement of Principles to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations they have under relevant international legal frameworks, notably the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to make a commitment to implement on a voluntary basis the following principles:

-- Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances;

-- Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities;

-- Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances in order to prevent illicit trafficking in such materials and substances, to include cooperation in the research and development of national detection capabilities that would be interoperable;

-- Improve capabilities of participants to search for, confiscate, and establish safe control over unlawfully held nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or devices using them.

-- Prevent the provision of safe haven to terrorists and financial or economic resources to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances;

-- Ensure adequate respective national legal and regulatory frameworks sufficient to provide for the implementation of appropriate criminal and, if applicable, civil liability for terrorists and those who facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism;

-- Improve capabilities of participants for response, mitigation, and investigation, in cases of terrorist attacks involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances, including the development of technical means to identify nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances that are, or may be, involved in the incident; and

-- Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking appropriate measures consistent with their national law and international obligations to protect the confidentiality of any information which they exchange in confidence.

Global Initiative participants recognize the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the fields of nuclear safety and security and the IAEA has been invited to serve as an observer to the Initiative. All participants commend the IAEA for its action in the field of nuclear security. Participants intend for the IAEA to contribute to the Initiative through its ongoing activities and technical expertise.

The initial partner nations intend to establish a terms of reference for implementation and assessment to support effective fulfillment of the initiative, including by facilitating the provision of assistance to participants that may require it, and facilitating suitable exercises.

They express the desire to broaden participation in the Global Initiative to other countries who share the common goals of the Initiative, are actively committed to combating nuclear terrorism, and endorse the Statement of Principles.

End text of the GICNT Statement of Principles.

¶12. Begin text of sample letter of endorsement.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore presents its compliments to the (Department of State of the United States of America) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) and has the honor to inform herewith of the Government of Singapore's decision to endorse the Statement of Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

The Government of Singapore endorses the Statement of Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism as adopted during the first meeting in Rabat, Morocco, on October 30-31, 2006.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore avails itself to this opportunity to renew to the (Department of State of the United States of America) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) the assurances of its highest consideration.

End text of sample letter of endorsement.

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POINT OF CONTACT  
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¶13. (U) The Department greatly appreciates Post's

assistance. All cables associated with the GICNT should be  
slugged to the Department for ISN/WMDT and the relevant  
regional bureaus. E-mails regarding the GICNT may be sent to

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CLINTON